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Abstract: This article explores how the populist radical right manage identity talk on an international stage. Speeches from the Europe of
Nations and Freedom conference held in Koblenz, Germany, on January 21, 2017, were analyzed using a rhetorical and critical discursive
psychology approach. This occasion was a celebratory public display of international solidarity between political actors who privilege national
interests, advocate stronger immigration control and are Eurosceptic. Results highlight two interdependent rhetorical strategies that construct
an inclusive diverse transnational political community, built on the core shared ideology of exclusionary nationalist nativism. Firstly,
“Constructing the Transnational Patriot” works up a superordinate political category often labeled the “patriots” that transcends individual
nation-states. Temporal and spatial boundary work was done to construct the political collective as extensive, expanding and enduring. This
capacity for the speakers to position themselves as prototypical members of a transnational political community facilitates and demands the
second rhetorical strategy, “Ambivalent Diversity.” Here speakers acknowledge and celebrate the cultural diversity of their political collective
through a precious “national diversity” between nation-states while simultaneously displaying hostility to cultural diversity within nation-
states. Speakers present themselves, and their political collective, as courageous protectors of the segregated national diversity against the
threatening collusion between the violent oppressive political “elite” and exploitative immigrants. The speakers hijack the liberal
understanding of diversity and reconfigure it in support of an argument defending the victimized majority and national cultural homogeneity.
Keywords: Transnational populism, ethno-pluralism, cross national diffusion, political mobilization, political identity
A wealth of psychological research has explored the dis-
course of populist radical right politicians aimed at mobiliz-
ing the citizens of their home nation-state (e.g., Mols &
Jetten, 2014, 2016). But little attention has been paid to
the capacity of the populist radical right to mobilize a poli-
tical collective at a transnational level, while paradoxically
advancing their core ideology of inward-looking nativist
nationalism. Hence, this article explores the populist radical
right’s presentation of transnational solidarity on an inter-
national stage through the analysis of speeches from a
historic international conference held by the Europe of
Nations and Freedom Group (ENF, 2017) in Koblenz,
Germany on January 21, 2017. This event was attended
by eleven leading populist radical right members of the
European parliament, offering rare insight into a public dis-
play of transnational collaboration and discourse aimed at
an international audience. Furthermore, at the time of this
conference, several occurrences had validated the populist
radical right internationally. These included the UK voting
on June 23, 2016 to leave the EU and Donald Trump’s
victory in the US elections on November 9, 2016. We were
particularly interested in the discursive identity work done,
in an attempt to mobilize a transnational collective and how
this was managed alongside the contradictory core ideology
of nationalist nativism.
The Populist Radical Right Mobilize the
Political Collective Through an
Exclusionary Ideology
In the 1970s the French National Front, the largest
membership of the ENF Group, rebranded their political
image through an ideological shift from “biological racism”
to “cultural racism,” which Rydgren (2005) refers to as the
“new master frame.” After electoral success in 1984 other
populist radical right parties emulated the “new master
frame” through a process of “cross-national diffusion.” This
transnational rebranding can also be recognized through
the ideological shift away from racial superiority to ethno-
pluralism – which advocates the preservation of incommen-
surable pure homogenous national cultures that require
being kept separate through restrictions on immigration
and rejection of supranational institutions, such as
the European Union (Bastow, 2002; Rydgren, 2007;
Spektorowski, 2000, 2003).
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Hence, the populist discourse of the radical right presents
them as possessing the political will to protect the interests
of the majority homogenous “people” against culturally
diverse immigrants, political “elites,” and supporters of
multiculturalism (Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Sakki
et al., 2018; Sakki & Pettersson, 2016; Wodak, 2013).
Multiculturalism is constructed as a failed ideology (Mols
& Jetten, 2014) that victimizes the “ordinary hard-working
taxpayers” (Mols & Jetten, 2016) and is imposed upon the
indigenous citizens (Bull & Simon-Vandenbergen, 2014).
Ethno-pluralism is a xenophobic discursive strategy that
justifies the exclusion of Muslims from European nation-
states (Kutay, 2015). Crucially, national economic concerns
tend not to be at the core of the populist radical right man-
ifesto, but the primary anxiety is the threat to the national
community from cultural diversity (Golder, 2016; Jay
et al., 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2016).
However, Sakki and Pettersson (2016) highlight the
populist radical right’s construction of an enemy “other”
is not unique to Swedish and Finish discourse but is a
“transnational” phenomenon. Caiani (2018) also notes
that the populist radical right is increasingly engaged in
international networking and events. And they efficiently
mobilize a transnational collective, based on a shared
ethno-nationalist ideology, by employing social media to
disseminate cartoons that humiliate immigrants and refu-
gees (Doerr, 2017). Nevertheless, others dispute the radical
right’s ability to convincingly perform transnational
populism, because their concept of the “people” is depen-
dent on the nation (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Moffitt,
2017). Hence, an examination is warranted into the
discursive and rhetorical identity work being undertaken
to potentially achieve transnational mobilization of the
populist radical right using a new sanitized political
image.
Politicians Construct an Inclusive Identity
to Mobilize and Expand Their Political
Constituency
Previous research indicates that social categories are not
predetermined concrete phenomena drawn from the con-
textual backdrop to simply inform political debate. Instead,
social categories are deployed in talk and do political work
through the strategic construction of boundaries between
“us” and “them” (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017, p. 91). Social
categories define who belongs and, importantly, what
values, norms, and beliefs are significant to the members.
Hence, social categories are a means to mobilize a political
collective through the production of a shared social reality
that informs how people can act within the world. They
construct, consolidate, and reaffirm shared understandings
and representations of the social, political, and historical
context.
Effective political speakers mobilize support through
identity performance as entrepreneurs of identity (Reicher
& Hopkins, 2001). The skilful leader will present them-
selves as a prototypical member of an overarching common
ingroup that draws together a diverse constituency. To
extend the reach of their constituency they will proclaim
their political project to be inclusive and reflecting the
norms, values, and interests of all the members of the com-
mon identity category. Political speakers tend to construct
the ingroup as all-encompassing and extensive, while the
outgroup is presented as a diminished minority. For exam-
ple, Barack Obama presented himself as the embodiment
of a diverse America (Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012). While
speakers on the political margins are unable to point to a
cohesive overarching ingroup in the present, they may
orient to an aspirational common identity located in the
future (Condor et al., 2013).
Often political actors will invoke the national category
and present themselves as prototypical citizens, because it
appeals to the entire electorate (Augoustinos & De Garis,
2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2017). Politicians construct a
version of the national character that aligns with their poli-
tical project (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). However, political
actors can also seek legitimization beyond the nation-state
by presenting their political position as representing the
whole world and being universally beneficial to all (Billig,
1995, p. 171; Haslam et al., 2010, p. 157). In a globalized
world the presentation of a global political identity is
increasingly important (Gleibs & Reddy, 2017) and the
notion of “cross-national diffusion” (Rydgren, 2005) poten-
tially indicates that a global identity is also important to the
populist radical right. However, the identity work – and
hence the construction of a shared representation of the
social world – that underpins the internationally expanding
populist radical right has received little exploration. To
date, research has focused on the populist radical right’s
construction of national categories, and their rejection of
cultural diversity. The paradox of constructing an inclusive
transnational political collective based on the core ideology
of exclusionary nationalist nativism merits further consid-
eration and is a core aim of this paper.
Method
Videos of the eleven speakers at the Koblenz, ENF confer-
ence, January 21, 2017, were retrieved from online sources
providing 140min 48 s of transcribed speeches. We utilized
publicly available English translations where speakers used
languages other than English, because this captures the
international online presence of the conference and the
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multilingual nature of the conference itself. Where footage
was provided with subtitles, we privileged these over
impromptu spoken translations, with the rationale that the
translator producing subtitles after the event had the
benefit of knowing the full context of the speech.
The speakers were as follows:
– Markus Pretzell, Alternative for Germany (AFD);
– Marine Le Pen, French, Front National;
– Geert Wilders, Dutch, Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for
Freedom);
– Matteo Salvini, Italy, Lega Nord (Northern League);
– Harald Vilimsky, Freedom Party of Austria (FPO);
– Frauke Petry, AfD;
– Tom Van Grieken, Belgian Vlaams Belang (VB;
Flemish Interest);
– Gerolf Annemans, (VB; no publicly available English
translation therefore omitted from the analysis);
– Janice Atkinson, British, Independent;
– Tomio Okamura, Czech Republic, Freedom and Direct
Democracy;
– Laurentiu Rebega, Romanian, Independent.
For more information see Electronic Supplementary
Material, ESM 1.
Analytic Framework
We employed a discursive psychology framework, because
it considers discourse, not to be a mere conveyer of infor-
mation, but a collaborative social act that constructs social
reality, mobilizes social categories, and hence, explores the
action orientation of discourse (Edwards & Potter, 1992;
Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This approach differs from other
discourse analysis, because it focuses on fundamental psy-
chological phenomena such as the social categorization of
the self and others, but it avoids making assumptions about
the speaker’s inaccessible internal world by attending to
what is being accomplished through the discourse
(Augoustinos & Tileagă, 2012; McNamara et al., 2013;
Stevenson & Muldoon, 2010). Furthermore, discursive psy-
chology is strongly influenced by conversation analysis, and
hence, employs systematic and fine-grained analysis of talk
and text to show how people construct, debate, and contest
shared understandings of the social world (Augoustinos &
Tileagă, 2012).
Additionally, we took a critical perspective, which entails
highlighting the hegemonic discourses that maintain
inequitable power relations between social groups (Nightin-
gale et al., 2017; Wetherell, 1998). Hence, particular atten-
tion is given to social category work done through the
discourse, the drawing of boundaries between “us” and
“them,” and defining the values, beliefs, and norms that
are important to “us” (O’Donnell et al., 2016). We also
drew on rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1987), which explores
the argumentative strategies employed by speakers to coun-
ter and delegitimize the opposing position through the con-
struction of an apparently rational and balanced argument.
Hence, extracts presented here are exemplars of identity
performance and particularly identity entrepreneurship that
mobilizes a political collective. Following from Reicher and
Hopkins (2001), the entrepreneur of identity is seen to (1)
construct a cohesive superordinate identity category that
is inclusive of a diverse audience; (2) tie their political
agenda to the norms and values prized by the invoked iden-
tity category; (3) position themselves as prototypical of the
identity category.
Results
The analysis exposed two interdependent discursive and
rhetorical strategies deployed in the construction of a trans-
national political collective. The first strategy, “Constructing
the Transnational Patriot,”works up a unified superordinate
identity, which transcends individual nation-states and is
often referred to by speakers as “us patriots.” The spatial
and temporal work done constructs the “patriot” identity
as extensive, expanding, and enduring. The “patriot” is pre-
sented as an aspirational and ambiguously inclusive political
identity (Condor et al., 2013). This tendency for speakers to
position themselves as prototypical members of a transna-
tional political collective, the “patriots,” requires them to
also take up the second rhetorical strategy of “Ambivalent
Diversity.” Here the populist radical right speakers who
are ordinarily hostile toward cultural diversity within
nation-states orient to a precious cultural diversity between
nation-states. This ambivalent position toward cultural
diversity enables the populist radical right to construct an
inclusive diverse transnational political community built
on the core shared ideology of exclusionary nationalist
nativism.
Constructing the Transnational Patriot
A striking aspect of the speeches at the ENF conference
was the considerable identity work that the speakers dedi-
cated to constructing an inclusionary transnational political
community and celebrating an expanding membership.
The construction of this extensive, expanding, and endur-
ing political category, often referred to as “us patriots,”
stands in stark contrast to the exclusionary nationalist
nativism ideology that defines the political identity.
Atkinson declares a unifying political community, “us
patriots,” which she positions herself and the audience
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within, using the first-person plural “us” (Table 1, line 1).
She presents the “patriots” as being an expanding category,
an aspirational identity (Condor et al., 2013), by declaring
their recent transnational success, “what a great year 2016
was for us patriots” (line 1). She confirms the “great[ness]”
of the “patriots” political reach by orienting to two con-
crete international victories, “Brexit Trump just to name a
few” (line 1). This reference to the UK voting to leave the
EU in the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s election
as US president, extends the “patriot” boundary beyond
the immediate audience to include supporters of these
“patriot” victories. Furthermore, these two examples are
embedded within an infinite three-part list culminating in
“just to name a few” (Jefferson, 1990). Hence, the list has
not been exhausted but is strategically unconstrained.
Implying that there are too many undeclared examples of
the “patriots” expanding international support to mention
them all.
This expansion of the category boundary of the “patriot”
collective is reiterated through the metaphor “the political
pendulum . . . has swung” (line 2). Atkinson proceeds to
claim that the weight of the “political pendulum” is not
about to commence its return swing as, “more is yet to
come” (line 3). The transnational political expansion is spe-
cifically evident “in Europe across and across the Atlantic”
(line 2) but this is only the start of the rise of the “patriots”
as the political momentummoves increasingly in their favor.
Where these future victories will occur is ambiguously
unspecified, “just to name a few” (line 1). The aspirational
“patriot” identity is constructed as inclusive and the expand-
ing transnational boundary is limitless.
The UK’s departure from the EU should render the
alliance with Euro-sceptic members of the European
Parliament redundant. But Atkinson reassures her fellow
“patriots”, that “we” (line 5) [the British] are committed
to an enduring transnational “patriot” collective, “don”t
worry my friends we are not pulling up the drawbridge”
(lines 4–5). This commitment is independent of the EU,
which is portrayed as an oppressive tyrant, “we are merely
unshackling ourselves from the unaccountable anti-
democratic EU” (lines 5–6). Atkinson constructs the political
collective as being an informal alliance of “friends” that will
endure her having to leave the EU parliamentary group after
Brexit. Even though the European “patriots” that she
addresses as “friends” (line 4), will no longer be welcome
to freely live and work in Britain. Atkinson rhetorically
manages the tension between constructing an inclusive
transnational “patriot” identity and the core exclusionary
nationalist ideology by resorting to a paradoxical claim that
“we are not pulling up the drawbridge” (line 5). But it is
undeclared who or what passes over the metaphoric bridge.
Presumably it purely serves to maintain ties between
members of an enduring transnational “patriot” collective.
The use of “patriot” to invoke a political community by
the populist radical right has not been highlighted in
previous research, but it appears to be particularly useful
for producing solidarity between nationalist speakers in this
international context. Here, Geert Wilders also makes use
of the “patriot” identity to construct an inclusive and
expanding category (Table 2).
Wilders orients to the recent victories of the populist radi-
cal right, “There is, however, much positive news” (Table 2,
line 1). “There is reason for hope” (line 1). He embeds this
positive turn of events in an aspirational repertoire that
offers “hope” (line 1) for the future and now “there is light
at the end of the tunnel. Better times will come” (line 2).
Equivalent to Atkinson’s reference to the swing of a “politi-
cal pendulum” (Table 1, line 2) to indicate increased global
support, Wilders draws on the metaphor, “the wind started
to shift last year” (Table 2, line 3). His speech offers an
ambiguously inclusive and aspirational political identity
(Condor et al., 2013), declaring the political change last year
“brought us the victory” (line 3) of “Donald Trump” (line 4).
This political “victory” not only occurred in “America” (line
6), but it is also repeated in political events across a number
of nation-states, “Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy,
Austria, throughout Europe: The patriots are winning”
(lines 6–7).
In line 8 Wilders draws on the notion that political
change is imminent and hence transnational support for
the “patriot” political agenda is on the rise, “the time for
Table 1. Extract from Janice Atkinson
1 what a great year 2016 was for us patriots (.) Brexit, Trump just
to name a few (.)
2 the political pendulum in Europe across and across the Atlantic
has swung
3 and more is yet to come (.) UK will be leaving the EU
4 but don’t worry my friends
5 we are not pulling up the drawbridge we are merely unshackling
6 ourselves from the unaccountable anti-democratic EU
Table 2. Extract from Geert Wilders (Punctuation from subtitles)
1 There is, however, much positive news. There is reason for hope.
2 There is light at the end of the tunnel. Better times will come.
3 The wind started to shift last year. It brought us the victory of
4 – and from here, congratulations to – Donald Trump,
5 the President of the United States.
6 But not only in America. We also see it here in Germany, the
Netherlands,
7 France, Italy, Austria, throughout Europe: The patriots are
winning.
8 The time for a change has come. And that is why, my friends,
9 it gives me tremendous courage to see you all here today.
10 This room full of German patriots shows me something very
important.
11 It shows me that Germany is not lost!
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a change has come.” He then consolidates the “patriot”
identity, “that is why, my friends, it gives me tremendous
courage to see you all here today” (lines 8–9), by locating
himself amongst “friends” (line 8) and “German patriots”
(line 10) upon whom his position of “tremendous courage”
(line 9) is dependent. He is the embodiment of “courage”
(line 9) bestowed upon him by the “room full of” brave
“German patriots” (line 10) who will fearlessly protect
“Germany” from being “lost!” (line 11).
The brave “patriots” offers relief from the pervasive dark-
ness, “There is light at the end of the tunnel. Better times
will come” (line 2). Wilders consolidates and mobilizes the
“patriots” through a victorious battle cry, “Germany is not
lost!” (line 11). He constructs a shared position, characteriz-
ing the “patriots” as brave combatants against the forces of
darkness that conspire to bring down the nation-state (line
3). Their “courage” offers hope (see also Reicher & Haslam,
2017), an end to the long suffered appalling situation. And,
more importantly, those in opposition to the “patriots” are
implicitly depicted as a threat who allow the dreadful situa-
tion to perpetuate and actively promote ruin.
Ambivalent Diversity
Having established a transnational “patriot” identity, the
populist radical right speakers use a rhetorical strategy that
we refer to as “Ambivalent Diversity,” which constructs an
inclusive diverse transnational political collective, while
maintaining their core ideology of exclusionary nationalist
nativism. Specifically, the speakers take both negative and
positive positions on cultural diversity, through the celebra-
tion of a precious cultural diversity between nation-states,
which is dependent on the implicit assumption of a mono-
culture within nation-states. This allows them to valorize
diversity, while simultaneously advocating exclusionary
anti-immigrant ideals. Frauke Petry orients to the “paradox”
between these two modes of diversity (Table 3, line 1).
Petry constructs a clear categorical distinction between
them and us – “the immigrants” (Table 3, line 2) and “our
own people” (line 3) – which is utilized to outline a funda-
mental “paradox” (line 1). A “universality” is “offered” by
the ingroup – “we” – to the outgroup – “the immigrants” –
which “paradoxically” is being denied to the ingroup – “we
are denying our own people” (lines 1–3). “Our own people”
are represented as naively benevolent toward the other,
“the immigrants” (line 2), because they are potentially
becoming culturally overwhelmed, “serving the masses of
immigration” (line 5), which is resulting in “Europe . . .
becoming very similar” (line 10).
Specifically, this “universality” offered to the other is a
“diversity” (line 7), which is “dreamt up by European
bureaucrats” (line 6). Here the repertoire orientates to a
liberal understanding of “diversity” embedded in EU
institutional directives, promoting cultural recognition, free
expression, inclusion, acceptance, and respect for individual
and minority group uniqueness. However, “diversity”
(line 7), which is institutionally sanctioned by “European
bureaucrats” (line 6) to protect the rights of individuals
and minority groups within the nation-state, is presented
here as problematic and juxtaposed with “recognising the
differences between our European countries” (line 4).
“The immigrants” (line 2) are explicitly distinguished from
“our own people” (line 3) and the “diversity” offered to
them undermines the fundamental concern of “our own
people,” which is the recognition of “the differences
between our European countries” (line 4).
The liberal understanding of “diversity” deployed in
arguments supporting “immigrants” (line 2) and “immigra-
tion” (line 5), is presented as imaginary, “dreamt up” (line
6) and a notion that necessitates being “sold to us” (line 7).
“Our own people” (line 3) are ignorant of the actual (line 5)
intent of the false “diversity.” The appeal to fact through
the use of “actually” (line 5), is a rhetorical strategy that
presents the speaker as objectively impartial and protects
them from accusations of prejudiced for what is about to
be said, “serving the masses of immigration” (line 5)
(Augoustinos & Every, 2007; Dixon, 2017).
Evidently, the false diversity “actually” co-opts “our own
people” into servitude (line 5) for the “masses of immigra-
tion.” “Masses” (line 5) is a common extreme case formu-
lation (Pomerantz, 1986), presenting the movement of
migrants as overwhelming and out of control. The rhetoric
works up a disturbing “actual” truth that opportunistic
masses are taking advantage of “our own peoples”
misguided benevolence (lines 6–7) and this is facilitated
by the “European bureaucrats” (line 6). This notion of
“diversity” presents the dominant majority culture as the
victim (McNeill et al., 2017) and the liberal enemy
within as colluding with the enemy immigrants from out-
side, which is a common rhetorical strategy used by the
populist radical right (Kutay, 2015; Reicher & Haslam,
2017).
Table 3. Extract from Frauke Petry
1 It’s a real paradox we are
2 the universality that we are offering to these to the immigrants
3 is something we are denying our own people.
4 We are not recognising the differences between our European
countries
5 and we are actually serving the masses of immigration
6 because this was something that was dreamt up by European
bureaucrats
7 and sold to us as diversity.
8 But what is diversity? This continent has got cultural linguistic
9 culinary national diversity we have got so many different models
10 and yet in this world in Europe it is all becoming very similar.
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Significantly, Petry proceeds to ask the question “what is
diversity?” (line 8). In answer the true diversity is defined,
“this continent has got cultural linguistic culinary national
diversity” (lines 8–9). The repertoire celebrates a precious
genuine “national diversity” (line 9), which is in opposition
to the “dreamt up” (line 6) diversity that requires being
“sold to us” (line 7). Evidently, “national diversity” is the
genuine “diversity,” because it is inherent within “the differ-
ences between our European countries” (line 4) on this
“continent” (line 8), which is constituted through different
cultural, linguistic and culinary practices (lines 8–9) of
“our own people” (line 2) and not “the immigrants” (line 2).
The “dreamt up” (line 6) diversity that is “serving masses of
immigration” (line 5) is a significant threat to the cherished
“national diversity” (line 9) due to its homogenizing influ-
ence, “in Europe it is all becoming very similar” (line 10).
The notion of “diversity” was not wholly discredited but
was taken up as a valued commodity and celebrated when
it was conceptualized as the “differences” between discrete
monocultural nation-states, while the liberal understanding
of “diversity” within the nation-state was condemned as
imaginary (line 6) and self-sabotaging. In other words, the
argument against immigration was not accomplished
through simple dismissal of the notion of “diversity,” but
“diversity” was hijacked and reconfigured in support of
differences between discrete monocultural nation-states
(Billig, 1987, p. 270).
In Table 4, Harald Valimsky orients to the fundamental
shared principle of the populist radical right, “we all respect
the character of our continent” (line 1), and skilfully posi-
tions himself as a superordinate spokesperson transcending
national boundaries. He proceeds to depict the essentialist
character of “our continent” based on an inherent cultural
heritage reaching back into a distant time, which “has got
thousands of years of history and culture” (line 3). Nostalgic
repertoires, intended to mobilize a national identity based
on an imagined shared history and culture, are common
amongst populist radical right speakers (e.g., Mols & Jetten,
2014; Rydgren & van der Meiden, 2019). But here, a trans-
national position is taken up by invoking “our continent”
and an inclusive diverse political identity is constructed
through the first-person plural: “we are a continent of plur-
alism and diversity” (line 4).
Intriguingly, Vilimsky’s speech heads off the potential
argument that this cultural diversity between nation-states
is a potential threat to security (lines 6–9). He claims that
Europe has managed to overcome its violent past and a
nationalist ideology is not problematic. The present peaceful
relationship between European nations is accentuated by
presenting the nation-state as a person (Lakoff & Chilton,
1995; Stenvall, 2018), “all countries – rather stand friendly
to one another” (line 6). They are relaxed informal “friends”
and “neighbors” (lines 8–9) who no longer experience
violent “jealousy” (line 8) desiring to inflict “harm” (line
9). This harmonious informal relationship metaphorically
presents nations as cordial friends in a “diverse” neighbor-
hood and plays down the institutional necessity of the EU
to maintain peace.
In Table 5 Marine Le Pen’s speech also works up an
ambivalent notion of diversity. She takes up a leadership
position, through the first-person plural “we,” commanding
the audience to follow her to “abandon the prison of the
European Union” (Table 5, lines 1 – 2). The rhetoric posi-
tions the “European Union” as a serious threat to liberty
by portraying it to be the most oppressive of disciplinary
institutions. This is alarmingly threatening, but paradoxi-
cally the “European Union” is also presented as an ineffec-
tual “prison” that can be effortlessly “abandon[ed]” (line 1).
For the prison to be abandoned with such ease, potentially
“we” (line 1) are both inmates and jailors, and the “prison”
is of our own making.
Importantly, on leaving the European Union, “we will see
the rebirth of the diversity of European cultures and the
nations that compose it” (line 3). The disciplinary European
Union is suppressing the valued cultural diversity between
nations. The rhetoric emphasizes the urgency of the appeal
through the repetition of short phrases, “from then on, from
the moment when” (line 1) and presents the “rebirth of the
diversity” (line 3) as being singularly contingent on leaving
the EU “prison.” The freedom gained by release from “the
prison of the European Union” is the freedom to defend the
monocultures of individual European nations (Rydgren,
2007). Le Pen uses the first-person plural, “we” (lines 1–
2) to work up a shared identity with the immediate audi-
ence attending the conference and also the extensive audi-
ence beyond (Billig et al., 1988; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).
In this international context “we” (lines 1–2) extends
beyond the speaker’s individual nation-state, in an attempt
to build political solidarity amongst all Europeans who are
imprisoned by the “European Union” (lines 1–2).
Evidently the “rebirth of the diversity,” constituted by
discrete bounded homogenous national cultures, does not
pose a threat to security, (lines 4–5). On the contrary, the
speech declares it will enable a renewed peace (lines
Table 4. Extract from Harald Vilimsky
1 They see that we all respect the character of our continent
2 more than the other parties.
3 Our continent has got thousands of years of history and culture
4 we are a continent of pluralism and diversity.
5 A continent which has managed to ensure that all cities
6 – all countries rather – stand friendly to one another.
7 That we have managed to overcome the wars of the past.
8 No one no one is now looking jealously at their neighbors
9 to do something to harm their neighbor quite the opposite.
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9–10) and counters the argument that the EU has facilitated
the longest period of peace within Europe. It dismisses the
troubled legacy of European nationalism – “This diversity
isn’t synonymous with war contrary to what years of
ideology wanted to make us believe” (lines 4–5). Although
Europe’s turbulent, violent, and at times genocidal history
indicates the opposite, the speech reassures the audience
that a diversity between nations does not facilitate antago-
nistic division and is not a potential ingredient for violent
conflict (lines 4–5).
Conversely, the project of a “union” between European
states, which marches forward in a “lock-step” of compliant
conformity, is explicitly declared to be a state of “war”
(lines 6–7). The “war” is between the EU institution and
individual member states, which are locked into the prison
(line 1). The “war” is also caused by the “disconnected
elites” (line 7) who advocate, “arming against Mr. Trump
or Mr. Putin!” (lines 6–7). The expressed security concern
and transnational political alliance does not only have a
Western reach, but it also extends east to “Mr. Putin”
and Russia (line 7). A common populist rhetorical strategy
is deployed that defends the victimized righteous pure
people in opposition to a corrupt “elite,” who in this case
alarmingly jeopardize peace (McNeill et al., 2017).
Crucially, Le Pen proceeds to position herself as a diplo-
matic peacemaker as she explains that, “a different people
isn’t an enemy people. A different people is one with which
I am going to build a relationship” (lines 9–10). The talk
clearly embraces diversity, declaring that she will not be
hostile to people who are different, she will not make them
her “enemy,” but on the contrary, she will reach out to
them and “build a relationship” (lines 9–10).
Discussion
Our analysis shows that the populist radical right speakers,
in this public international context, position themselves as
prototypical members of a transnational culturally diverse
political collective, which is extensive, expanding and
enduring. Similar to centre ground politicians the populist
radical right, construct an aspirational (Condor et al.,
2013), inclusive (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) and diverse
(Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012) political identity, which is
often referred to as “us patriots.” A unified political collec-
tive of victorious “patriots” is constructed and mobilized,
which transcends individual nation-states. The “patriot”
collective is often presented as limitless and ambiguously
inclusive. The speakers draw on powerful metaphors to
emphasize their extensive and expanding political support
and orient to an enduring solidarity that is independent of
the EU. The audience is to understand that “Patriots”
reside everywhere and new support may well surface
anywhere.
The superordinate transnational positioning of the speak-
ers compels them to take up a discursive strategy of
ambivalent diversity that acknowledges and celebrates their
diverse political collective. In contrast to previous research
highlighting the populist radical right’s hostility toward cul-
tural diversity (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2014, 2016), here they
orient to a valued notion of national diversity, the differ-
ence between national cultures. This repertoire of ambiva-
lent diversity accomplishes two matters. One, it
dexterously manages the ambivalent tension between the
core political doctrine of exclusionary nationalism versus
the mobilization of an inclusive diverse political community
that transcends the nation-state. Two, it takes up the valued
liberal notion of “diversity” and reconceptualizes it in favor
of exclusionary arguments (Billig, 1987). While the liberal
opposition are constructed as a disreputable and a dimin-
ished marginal group that nobody would wish to be a mem-
ber of (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).
The populist radical right’s new sanitized ideology of
ethno-pluralism is an effective means to distance them-
selves from their past tainted ideology of biological racism
while maintaining an exclusionary xenophobic agenda (see
Bastow, 2002; Kutay, 2015; Rydgren, 2007; Spektorowski,
2000, 2003). We expand on this, by highlighting how the
ideology of ethno-pluralism affords a repertoire of “ambiva-
lent diversity” that constructs and mobilizes an inclusive
transnational diverse collective, often labeled “us patriots.”
We note that De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) question the
ability of the radical right to convincingly construct a popu-
list transnational “people” due to the ambivalent tension
with their core exclusionary doctrine of nativist nationalism.
However, it can be argued that this ambivalent tension
between the particular (the exclusionary nation-state) and
the universal (a world made up of nation-states), which is
fundamental to nationalism (Billig, 1995, p. 87), may actu-
ally facilitate the construction of a transnational “people”
and render the ideology of ethno-pluralism universally
acceptable. Nationalism accomplishes this contradiction,
Table 5. Extract from Marine Le Pen
1 From then on, from the moment when we abandon the prison
2 of the European Union, we will see the rebirth of the diversity
3 of European cultures and the nations that compose it.
4 This diversity isn’t synonymous with war, contrary to what years
5 of ideology wanted to make us believe.
6 War, on the contrary, is this Union in lock-step.
7 War is those disconnected elites who are calling for arming
8 against Mr. Trump or Mr. Putin! (.9) (audience clapping)
9 A different people isn’t an enemy people. A different people
10 is one with which I am going to build a relationship.
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between exclusion and inclusion, within everyday “banal”
articulation and social practice. In order for a particular
nation-state to be imagined, it has to be imagined within
a universal world made up of nation-states. The discourse
of nationalism is hegemonic as all “people” belong to a par-
ticular nation-state, at least in theory, and the world of
nations is construed as natural and taken-for-granted –
making the construction of a transnational “people”
unproblematic.
Additionally, ambivalent diversity is a rhetorical strategy
that presents the argument as balanced and rational by
embracing the valued commodity of cultural diversity.
Speakers undermine the liberal interpretation of “diver-
sity,” used in arguments defending minority rights and cel-
ebrating multicultural societies (Spektorowski, 2000,
2003), by turning it back on itself through the construction
of an argument in defence of the victimized majority and
national cultural homogeneity. Evidently the speakers are
not advocating multiculturalism, where individuals and
minority groups of different cultures within the nation-state
are afforded equal status (Pehrson et al., 2014). Quite the
opposite, cultural diversity is to be protected through, the
denial of minority and individual rights, restricted move-
ment across national borders, and rejection of suprana-
tional political institutions, such as the EU. This taking up
of fundamental elements of the opposing argument and
reversing its normative liberal understanding is an effective
rhetorical strategy (Billig, 1987, p. 270). Previous discursive
psychology research has noted similar ambivalent reversal
of liberal values such as equality, justice, and rights, to legit-
imize racial hostility and reject affirmative action policy
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 198). Importantly, “diversity”
is not ineptly dismissed, but is skilfully redirected, because
it is a prevalent cherished value that calls up a broad “col-
lective commitment” to the ideological position being pre-
sented (McGee, 1980).
Significantly, the speeches celebrate the notion of
“national diversity” between nation-states, based on valued
cultural characteristics that have historic continuity. This
provides supporting evidence that the ideology of ethno-
pluralism acts as the foundation for nostalgic discourses
celebrating a past golden age of discrete monocultural
nations (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019). National diversity is
also akin to harmonious neighbors, compassionate friend-
ships, respectful relationship building, and ultimately secur-
ity. Conversely, diversity within nation-states, due to
immigration, was depicted as false, dangerous, and having
an overwhelming homogenising effect, which is harmful to
the valued national diversity. The “patriots” position them-
selves as prototypical members of the political collective
who singularly have the courage to defend the true idyllic
national diversity, and the victimized majority, against a
dishonest, violent and oppressive political “elite” that
conspire with the exploitive immigrants (Haslam et al.,
2010). The discourse is reminiscent of Donald Trump’s
identity work on the campaign trail, offering “hope” to
the American people in dark times (Reicher & Haslam,
2017). The speeches consolidate political solidarity through
mobilizing battle cries of collective courage. The reconfigur-
ing of diversity unites and mobilizes the transnational
“patriot” collective by declaring that dominant majority
national cultures to be the true victims (also see McNeill
et al., 2017; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012).
Conclusion
Paradoxically, the globalized interdependent world that the
populist radical right is hostile toward, potentially compels
them to position themselves as global actors and work up
a transnational political identity. To stand as convincing,
qualified, and competent political contenders within the
contemporary global environment, their ideological position
requires the appearance of widespread international sup-
port and legitimacy. This necessitates the populist radical
right leaders to position themselves at a superordinate level
and mobilize an inclusive diverse transnational political
collective – us patriots – based on their core ideology of
exclusionary nationalist nativism. Future research needs
to extend this by paying increased attention to the transna-
tional identity work done by the populist radical right to
disseminate their exclusionary ideology and explore how
grassroot supporters are engaging with this transnational
mobilization.
This article reveals the discursive identity work done to
facilitate the “cross national diffusion” of the populist
radical right’s rebranded political identity, the “new master
frame” (Rydgren, 2005). This shift of the core ideology from
biological racism to cultural racism and ethno-pluralism, not
only sanitizes the political image of the populist radical right
but enables the transnational dissemination of the exclu-
sionary ideology through the new capacity to construct
and mobilize an inclusive diverse transnational identity.
The populist radical right is no longer dependent on a notion
of racial superiority, because the ideology of ethno-pluralism
presents all ethnic cultures as equal but incommensurable
and incompatible (Rydgren, 2007). Hence, these speakers,
in this international context, can be seen to efficiently take
up a position of transnational populism that speaks to a
universal “people” (cf. De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017;
Moffitt, 2017). The rhetorical strategy of ambivalent diver-
sity hijacks the liberal understanding of diversity and redir-
ects it in support of anti-immigrant and Euroscepticism by
presenting minority diversity within nation-states, and the
EU, as intrinsic threats to the cherished national diversity
between states.
European Psychologist (2021), 26(1), 45–54 2021 Hogrefe Publishing Distributed under the Hogrefe
OpenMind License https://doi.org/10.1027/a000001



































































The electronic supplementary materials are available with
the online version of the article at https://doi.org/10.1027/
1016-9040/a000416
ESM 1. Details about the eleven speakers
References
Augoustinos, M., & De Garis, S. (2012). “Too black or not black
enough”: Social identity complexity in the political rhetoric of
Barack Obama. European Journal of Social Psychology, 42,
564–577.
Augoustinos, M., & Every, D. (2007). The language of “race” and
prejudice: A discourse of denial, reason, and liberal-practical
politics. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 26, 123–
141. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X07300075
Augoustinos, M., & Tileagă, C. (2012). Twenty five years of
discursive psychology. British Journal of Social Psychology,
51, 405–412.
Bastow, S. (2002). A neo-fascist third way: The discourse of ethno-
differentialist revolutionary nationalism. Journal of Political Ideolo-
gies, 7, 351–368. https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931022000010610
Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to
social psychology. Cambridge University Press.
Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. Sage Publications.
Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., & Gane, M. (1988). Ideological
dilemmas: A social psychology of everyday thinking. SAGE
Publications.
Bull, P., & Simon-Vandenbergen, A.-M. (2014). Equivocation and
doublespeak in far right-wing discourse: An analysis of Nick
Griffin’s performance on BBC’s Question Time. Text & Talk, 34,
1–22. https://doi.org/10.1515/text-2013-0035
Caiani, M. (2018). Radical right cross-national links and interna-
tional cooperation. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of
the radical right (pp. 394–411). Oxford University Press.
Condor, S., Tileaga, C., & Billig, M. (2013). Political rhetoric. In L.
Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of
political psychology (pp. 262–297). Oxford University Press.
De Cleen, B., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). Distinctions and articula-
tions: A discourse theoretical framework for the study of
populism and nationalism. Javnost – The Public, 24, 301–319.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1330083
Dixon, J. (2017). “Thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant?”
Transcending the accuracy-inaccuracy dualism in prejudice
and stereotyping research. British Journal of Social Psychology,
56, 4–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12181
Doerr, N. (2017). Bridging language barriers, bonding against
immigrants: A visual case study of transnational network
publics created by far-right activists in Europe. Discourse &
Society, 28, 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926516676689
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive psychology. Sage.
Elcheroth, G., & Reicher, S. (2017). Identity, violence and power:
Mobilizing hatred, demobilising dissent. Springer.
Elgenius, G., & Rydgren, J. (2019). Frames of nostalgia and
belonging: The resurgence of ethno-nationalism in Sweden.
European Societies, 21, 583–602. https://doi.org/10.1080/
14616696.2018.1494297
ENF. (2017). Europe of Nations and Freedom. https://web.archive.
org/web/20170126184224/http://www.enfgroup-ep.eu/
Gleibs, I. H., & Reddy, G. (2017). The social and political psychol-
ogy of globalisation and global identities. In C. Howarth & E.
Andreouli (Eds.), The social psychology of everyday politics (pp.
65–78). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
Golder, M. (2016). Far right parties in Europe. Annual Review of
Political Science, 19, 477–497. https://doi.org/10.1146/an-
nurev-polisci-042814-012441
Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S., & Platow, M. (2010). The new psychology
of leadership: Identity, influence and power. Psychology Press.
Jay, S., Batruch, A., Jetten, J., McGarty, C., & Muldoon, O. T. (2019).
Economic inequality and the rise of far-right populism: A social
psychological analysis. Journal of Community & Applied Social
Psychology, 29(5), 418–428. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2409
Jefferson, G. (1990). List construction as a task and resource. In G.
Psathas (Ed.), Interaction competence (pp. 63–92). University
Press of Amer.
Kutay, A. (2015). Dominant pluralism and discursive strategies of
contemporary racism against Muslim minorities in Europe.
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 35, 1–16. https://doi.org/
10.1080/13602004.2015.1018722
Lakoff, G., & Chilton, P. (1995). Foreign policy by metaphor. In C.
Schäffne & A. L. Wenden (Eds.), Language & peace (pp. 61–84).
Routledge.
McGee, M. C. (1980). The “ideograph”: A link between rhetoric and
ideology. The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66, 1–16.
McNamara, N., Stevenson, C., & Muldoon, O. T. (2013). Community
identity as resource and context: A mixed method investigation
of coping and collective action in a disadvantaged community.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 393–403. https://
doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1953
McNeill, A., Pehrson, S., & Stevenson, C. (2017). The rhetorical
complexity of competitive and common victimhood in conver-
sational discourse. European Journal of Social Psychology, 47,
167–179. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2255
Moffitt, B. (2017). Transnational populism? Representative claims,
media and the difficulty of constructing a transnational
“people”. Javnost – The Public, 24, 409–425. https://doi.org/
10.1080/13183222.2017.1330086
Mols, F., & Jetten, J. (2014). No guts, no glory: How framing the
collective past paves the way for anti-immigrant sentiments.
International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 43, 74–86.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.08.014
Mols, F., & Jetten, J. (2016). Explaining the appeal of populist
right-wing parties in times of economic prosperity. Political
Psychology, 37, 275–292. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12258
Nightingale, A., Quayle, M., & Muldoon, O. (2017). “It's just heart
breaking”: Doing inclusive political solidarity or ambivalent
paternalism through sympathetic discourse within the “refugee
crisis” debate. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychol-
ogy, 27(2), 137–146. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2303
O’Donnell, A. T., Muldoon, O. T., Blaylock, D. L., Stevenson, C.,
Bryan, D., Reicher, S. D., & Pehrson, S. (2016). “Something that
unites us all”: Understandings of St. Patrick’s Day Parades as
Representing the Irish National Group. Journal of Community &
Applied Social Psychology, 26(1), 61–74. https://doi.org/
10.1002/casp.2236
Pehrson, S., Stevenson, C., Muldoon, O. T., & Reicher, S. (2014). Is
everyone Irish on St Patrick’s Day? Divergent expectations and
experiences of collective self-objectification at a multicultural
parade. British Journal of Social Psychology, 53(2), 249–264.
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12029
Pomerantz, A. (1986). Extreme case formulations: A way of
legitimizing claims. Human Studies, 9, 219–229.
Reicher, S., & Haslam, S. A. (2017). The politics of hope: Donald
Trump as an entrepreneur of identity. In M. Fitzduff (Ed.), Why
2021 Hogrefe Publishing Distributed under the Hogrefe
OpenMind License https://doi.org/10.1027/a000001
European Psychologist (2021), 26(1), 45–54


































































irrational politics appeals: Understanding the allure of Trump
(pp. 25–40). Praeger.
Reicher, S., & Hopkins, N. (1996). Self-category constructions in
political rhetoric; an analysis of Thatcher’s and Kinnock’s
speeches concerning the British miners’ strike (1984–5).
European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 353–371. https://
doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199605)26:3<353::AID-
EJSP757>3.0.CO;2-O
Reicher, S., & Hopkins, N. (2001). Self and nation: Categorization,
contestation and mobilization. Sage.
Rooyackers, I. N., & Verkuyten, M. (2012). Mobilizing support for
the extreme right: A discursive analysis of minority leadership.
British Journal of Social Psychology, 51, 130–148. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2010.02008.x
Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious?
Explaining the emergence of a new party family. European
Journal of Political Research, 44, 413–437. https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00233.x
Rydgren, J. (2007). The sociology of the radical right. Annual
Review of Sociology, 33, 241–262. https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.soc.33.040406.131752
Rydgren, J., & van der Meiden, S. (2019). The radical right and the
end of Swedish exceptionalism. European Political Science, 18,
439–455. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0159-6
Sakki, I., Hakoköngäs, E., & Pettersson, K. (2018). Past and
present nationalist political rhetoric in Finland: Changes and
continuities. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 37,
160–180. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927x17706945
Sakki, I., & Pettersson, K. (2016). Discursive constructions of
otherness in populist radical right political blogs. European
Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 156–170. https://doi.org/
10.1002/ejsp.2142
Spektorowski, A. (2000). The French new right: Differentialism and
the idea of ethnophilian exclusionism. Polity, 33, 283–303.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3235491
Spektorowski, A. (2003). The new right: Ethno-regionalism, ethno-
pluralism and the emergence of a neo-fascist “Third Way”.
Journal of Political Ideologies, 8, 111–130. https://doi.org/
10.1080/13569310306084
Stenvall, M. (2018). The construction of roles and responsibility in
“Europe’s” migrant crisis: A study on news agency reports.
Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines, 10,
154–166.
Stevenson, C., & Muldoon, O. T. (2010). Socio-political context and
accounts of national identity in adolescence. British Journal of
Social Psychology, 49(3), 583–599. https://doi.org/10.1348/
014466609x475972
Wetherell, M. (1998). Positioning and interpretative repertoires:
Conversation analysis and post-structuralism in dialogue.
Discourse & Society, 9, 387–412.
Wetherell, M., & Potter, J. (1992). Mapping the language of racism:
Discourse and the legitimation of exploitation. Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
Wodak, R. (2013). “Anything goes!” – The haiderization of Europe.
In R. Wodak, M. KhosraviNik, & B. Mral (Eds.), Right wing
populism in Europe: Politics and discourse (pp. 23–37) .
Bloomsbury.
History
Received December 11, 2018
Revision received March 6, 2020
Accepted April 23, 2020
Published online March 12, 2021
Funding
This project has received funding from the Irish Research Council
(GOIPG/2016/1487 to Alastair Nightingale) and the European
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020











Alastair Nightingale is an Irish Re-
search Council funded PhD candidate
from the University of Limerick, Ire-
land, researching how people are re-
sponding to the pressing social and
political issues of international mi-
gration and the rising populist radical
right drawing on the Social Identity
Approach and Discursive and Rheto-
rical Psychology.
Michael Quayle is a social psycholo-
gist lecturing at the University of
Limerick and honorary Senior lecturer
at the University of KwaZulu-Natal,
South Africa. His research explores
identity, and how active identity pro-
duction impacts on psychological
experiences and outcomes.
Orla Muldoon is founding Professor of
Psychology at University of Limerick.
She has been teaching and
researching applied social and polit-
ical psychology since completing her
PhD in Queens Belfast in 1996. Her
research explores how social identi-
ties are central to individual psy-
chology and wider social and
intergroup relations.
European Psychologist (2021), 26(1), 45–54 2021 Hogrefe Publishing Distributed under the Hogrefe
OpenMind License https://doi.org/10.1027/a000001
54 A. Nightingale et al., The Transnational Patriot
 h
ttp
s:
//e
co
nt
en
t.h
og
re
fe
.c
om
/d
oi
/p
df
/1
0.
10
27
/1
01
6-
90
40
/a
00
04
16
 -
 T
hu
rs
da
y,
 M
ar
ch
 1
8,
 2
02
1 
7:
05
:0
7 
A
M
 -
 I
P 
A
dd
re
ss
:2
12
.1
29
.7
7.
13
 
